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TITLE 
A combined risk analysis approach for complex dam-levee systems 
ABSTRACT 
In many areas of the world, dams and levees are built to reduce the likelihood of 
flooding. However, if they fail, the result can be catastrophic flooding beyond what 
would happen if they did not exist. Therefore, understanding the risk reduced by 
the dam or levee, as well as any risk imposed by these flood defences is of high 
importance when determining the appropriate risk reduction investment strategy. 
This paper describes an approach for quantifying and analysing risk for complex 
dam-levee systems, and its application to a real case study. The basis behind such 
approach rely on the potential of event tree modelling to analyse risk from 
multiple combinations of “load-system response-consequence” events, tested by 
the authors for a real case study. The combined approach shows how the 
contribution to system risk of each sub-system can be assessed. It also describes 
how decisions on risk mitigation measures, at the individual asset scale, can and 
should be informed in terms of how they impact the overall system risk.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Based on data from the CRED EM-DAT database, 90 million people were affected 
by coastal or river flooding worldwide over the 1980–2010 period (Ligtvoet et al., 
2014). By 2050, 15% of the global population will live in flood-prone areas. 
Dams and levees reduce the likelihood that people and property will get flooded. 
They also provide other benefits, such as water storage, recreation, and 
hydropower production. The role of these structural measures on flood risk 
reduction is unquestionable. However, their potential failure or mission disruption 
may lead to high consequences. The response of these structures to potential 
hazards (floods, earthquakes, droughts, etc.) should be analysed and risk to 
downstream areas should be quantified so that decision-makers can ensure the 
benefits gained from these structures are appropriate given the risks. 
The purpose of the research here presented is to describe a proposed approach for 
combined dam-levee risk analysis in order to inform flood risk management in 
complex systems. Addressing and analysing such complexity is one of the identified 
main concerns in the field of critical infrastructure governance (Escuder-Bueno 
and Halpin, 2016) where complexity refers (Renn, 2008) to the difficulty of 
identifying and quantifying causal links between multiple potential and specific 
adverse events. In this field, it is recognised the need to extend modelling in order 
to cope with the increasing complexity of systems.  
1.1. Current challenges on flood risk reduction 
Flood risk reduction is a global challenge. As an example, it is considered one of the 
specific Blueprint objectives at EU water policy level. The EU Directive 
2007/60/EC (European Parliament, 2007) on the assessment and management of 
flood risks requires all EU Member States to approach flood risk management in a 
three-stage process: (i) preliminary flood risk assessment, (ii) flood hazard maps 
and flood risk maps, and, (iii) flood risk management plans. These plans should 
include measures to reduce the probability of flooding and its potential 
consequences. The EU Floods Directive applies to different flood sources (river 
flooding, flash floods, coastal floods, storm surges and tsunamis), including 
potential failure of flood defense infrastructures. 
However, few tools are available that can assess complex systems using a multi-
hazard integrated approach.  
In addition, there is an opportunity for increased coordination in international 
research, development and innovation (RDI) activities in the area of complex 
system risk analysis. Many countries are attempting to tackle this challenge, and 
sharing of lessons learned will help all involved in the effort.  
As an example, the United States is a worldwide reference in dam and levee safety 
management. Current programs in the United States aim to manage risk from a 
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risk analysis. In addition, non-structural risk reduction measures, such as 
emergency preparedness and recovery, are playing a more relevant role than they 
did in the past when risk reduction was achieved primarily through the 
construction of flood defense infrastructures. 
1.2. The role of dams and levees on flood risk reduction 
Based on ICOLD Register of Dams, 48% of the 58,266 large dams worldwide (> 15 
m high) provide flood protection. In the U.S., there are more than 9,000 dams and 
floodplains are lined by up to 161,000 km of levees (U.S. National Committee on 
Levee Safety, 2009). In Europe, 6,100 large dams (12% of total number of large 
dams worldwide) create a reservoir capacity of about 410 km³. 
Any dam or levee is constructed to provide protection up to a given flood 
magnitude (the design of dam spillway capacity or levee height are based on a 
“design flood”).  
In the U.S., that level of protection varies widely (5-yr to 10,000-yr), depending on 
the regulations in place when the levee was designed. There is no set National 
standard for flood risk protection, but State or local standards are becoming more 
common. For example, California requires 200-yr level of protection for urban 
communities (Department of Water Resources, 2012). If a local community seeks 
to cost share construction of levees with the Federal government, those levees are 
formulated to maximize net benefits (flood risk reduced minus cost of 
construction) rather than to a specific standard.  
Other countries also apply criteria for flood risk protection with levels up to 
10,000-yr (Kind, 2014). 
1.3. Methods and tools for dam and levee safety risk analysis 
Different methods and tools for flood risk characterization, analysis and 
assessment have been developed and applied in the last decades (de Bruijn et al., 
2014; DEFRA, 2006; Graham, 1999; Jonkman et al., 2008; Merz et al., 2010; 
Penning-Rowsell et al., 2005; Zhang et al., 2016). Existing methods in the literature 
vary on level of detail (e.g., screening, advanced), type of analysis, estimation of 
risk components (e.g., probability estimation, consequence estimation or both), 
and treatment of uncertainty (Apel et al., 2004). Consequently, there exist a wide 
range of available tools and methods for risk-based flood risk analysis. 
Potential failure or mission disruption of flood defences may occur from natural 
hazards or manmade threats. Physical failure of a part of a dam or levee system 
may have high structural, social, environmental, economic and political 
consequences. 
Particularly, several risk-based methodologies for dam safety analysis can be 
found (Harrald et al., 2006). Among them, event tree analysis is quite common, and 
can assess a wide range of potential combinations of plausible events that may 
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Rodríguez et al., 2014; Rosqvist et al., 2013). Event trees can be represented in a 
compact form through influence diagrams.   
The level of detail of a risk analysis will depend on information available and how 
it is incorporated into the risk model. The risk model may integrate results from a 
wide range of techniques for dam and levee failure analysis (de Bruijn et al., 2014; 
Olsson et al., 2003; Vrouwenvelder et al., 2010). 
This paper presents an integrated framework for flood risk analysis, which aims to 
estimate flood risk from dam and levee failure through the use of event tree 
modeling.  
1.4.  Towards risk-informed dam and levee safety governance 
In this context, the application of risk analysis techniques has emerged as a 
paradigm shift, enhancing dam safety and flood risk assessment and management.  
Regarding dam safety, following the journey initiated by the United States Bureau 
of Reclamation (USBR) in the nineties, the United States Army Corps of Engineers 
(USACE) and the Federal Emergency Regulatory Commission (FERC) have 
implemented risk-based dam safety management processes in the last decades 
(USACE, 2014). At the European level, France enacted specific regulation in 2008 
to develop the process at national level and Spain has recently published technical 
guidelines to apply risk analysis techniques for dam safety management 
(SPANCOLD, 2012). 
The state-of-the-practice worldwide recognizes the benefits of applying risk 
analysis as a tool for supporting decision-making on dam safety management. 
Concerning levee safety, trends are shifting worldwide from hazard analyses to 
more complex risk approaches (de Bruijn et al., 2014; Jonkman et al., 2011; Pinter 
et al., 2016; Voortman et al., 2003) .  
As an example, the Levee Safety Program established by the USACE started in 2007 
with the creation of the National Committee on Levee Safety (NCLS). In 2009, the 
NCLS Report to Congress provided recommendations for a National Levee Safety 
Program (U.S. National Committee on Levee Safety, 2009). These 
recommendations were focused on promoting “an involved public and reliable 
levee systems working as part of an integrated approach to protect people and 
property from floods”. As part of this Program, an inventory and screening-level 
risk assessment has been conducted for levees that fall within the Federal 
program. In 2014, the Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 
(WRRDA) authorized USACE to stand up the National Levee Safety Program, to 
include all levees in the Nation, not just those in the Federal program, in 
consultation with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 
The NCLS committee recommended that rather than focusing on a single event, 
risk from the full range of possible flood events should be considered. In recent 
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characterization for more than 2,000 levee segments, based on the Levee 
Screening Tool (LST) methodology (Margo et al., 2009).The screening process 
incorporates review of operation and maintenance, field inspections, stage-
frequency, structural, geotechnical, and component evaluation, and estimation of 
potential life loss. This method uses engineering assessment ratings (acceptable, 
minimally acceptable and unacceptable descriptors for assessing performance 
indicators) to infer the probability of levee breach. Baseline rates for reference 
performance modes, likelihood ratios for performance indicators and the method 
proposed by (Hill et al., 2003) for adjusting individual performance indexes are 
used. Levee failure is considered for scenarios with breach prior to overtopping 
and with overtopping. Results of the analysis are used to characterize levees into 
various categories, from ‘Very High Risk’ to ‘Low Risk’, which then informs further 
investment decisions for the portfolio. This screening levee assessment is the first 
stage of an on-going transition towards risk-informed levee safety management at 
national scale in the U.S.  
2. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
This paper describes a combined approach for flood risk analysis including failure 
of different flood protection defenses (i.e. dams and levees). This integration is 
conceptually and technically feasible and performed through a generic dam-levee 
risk model architecture herein proposed. 
2.1. Concepts and overall analysis framework 
For the purpose of this paper, the following terms are used: 
 Overtopping probability. It is obtained by analysing all combinations of 
events that result in water elevations that exceed dam or levee crest levels.  
 Failure probability. It is obtained as the likelihood of failure occurrence in 
any given year, by analysing all combinations of events that may lead to 
failure, including different load conditions and potential failure modes, 
taking into account potential breach with and without overtopping. 
 Societal risk. It is obtained by combining flood event probabilities and the 
potential consequences suffered by the population, generally expressed in 
terms of affected population or loss of life. Societal risk is commonly 
represented through FN-curves on a double log scale that depict the 
relation between life-loss and cumulative annual exceedance probabilities 
(Jonkman et al., 2011). The area under the FN-curve is equivalent to the 
expected annualized number of fatalities (EAF).  
 Economic risk. It is obtained by combining flood event probabilities and the 
potential economic consequences (Merz et al., 2010), expressed in 
monetary units. Similarly to societal risk, the area under an FD-curve is 
equivalent to the expected annualized economic damage (EAD).  
 Total risk. It is obtained by analysing flooding due to all potential flood 
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 Incremental risk. It is obtained by analysing consequences from failure,  
over and above any consequences which might have occurred for the same 
flood event or conditions, had the flood defense not failed (Morales-Torres 
et al., 2016; Serrano-Lombillo et al., 2011). Incremental risk is generally 
considered to evaluate dam risk results (ANCOLD, 2003). 
The risk analysis procedure proposed in (Castillo-Rodríguez et al., 2014) is 
considered, summarized in the following steps: 
 Phase I: definition of the scope and aim of the study  
 Phase II: review of available data 
 Phase III: definition of the current situation 
 Phase IV: risk model architecture 
 Phase V: input data 
 Phase VI: risk calculation 
 Phase VII: risk representation 
 Phase VIII: sensitivity and uncertainty analyses 
 Phase IX: risk evaluation 
 Phase X: risk reduction measures 
 Phase XI: risk management and governance  
The proposed approach is based on the aforementioned steps but not limited to 
their application. In this paper, a combined risk model architecture for complex 
dam-levee systems is presented to be applied in Phase IV. 
2.2 Proposed risk model architecture for complex dam-levee systems 
A generic influence diagram for risk analysis of complex dam-levee systems is 
presented in this paper and shown in Fig.1. The proposed risk model architecture 
provides an innovative model for analysing risk from complex dam-levee systems 
in an integrative and quantitative risk model, not yet considered in practice. 
There are three general categories of input data for the risk model: 
 Loads. These nodes include information from hydrological studies, water 
pool levels at reservoirs, annual exceedance probabilities of water 
elevations, reliability of water control structures (e.g. outlet works), flood 
routing studies, etc. 
 System response. These nodes include information from system response 
analysis (including failure mode identification, breach development, peak 
discharges for failure and non-failure scenarios), structural models, 
hydraulic models (e.g. wave arrival times, flood depths, etc. at flooded 
areas), etc. 
 Consequences. These nodes include information from life-loss estimation, 
economic consequence estimations (including rebuilding costs of flood 
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It is assumed that the system is composed by a dam (or system of dams) located 
upstream an area protected by one or more levee structures. 
Information required (numbers denote node location in Fig.1) for the risk model 
may include, but it is not limited to: 
1) Rainfall-runoff transfer information based on hydrological studies, rainfall-
runoff methods, etc. to characterize inflow floods at reservoirs or peak 
discharge in river courses. 
2) Historical data or simulations of water pool levels at reservoir. 
3) Reliability analysis of outlet works, gates, spillways, etc. that control water 
levels at river courses or reservoirs. Estimations may be based on historical 
data, fault tree analysis or expert judgement. 
4) Flood routing results from inflow hydrographs, previous water levels and 
reliability of water control structures. Loading scenarios are characterized by 
maximum water pool levels. 
5) Estimation of failure probabilities based on failure mode identification, 
numerical modelling, Monte Carlo simulations, fault tree analysis, expert 
judgement, etc. 
6) Outflow discharges and hydrographs, depending on maximum water pool 
levels and failure modes (e.g. type of breach, breach development, etc.). 
7) Results from flood routing analyses based on outflow hydrographs. 
8) Flood characteristics in downstream areas (flood depth, velocity, rise-rate, 
wave arrival times, flooded areas, etc.), obtained from hydraulic models. 
9) Flood characteristics along the river course obtained from dam-breach models. 
10) Estimated potential fatalities and economic damages at the study area. 
11) Flood characteristics at the study site from hydraulic modelling of levee failure 
scenarios. 
12) Estimated potential fatalities and economic damages at the study area, 
including reconstructions costs.        
Common cause adjustment is proposed for system response analysis when failure 
modes are not mutually exclusive (Hill et al., 2003; SPANCOLD, 2012). Conditional 
probabilities for identified failure modes that are not mutually exclusive can be 
adjusted for common cause occurrence by using the uni-modal bounds theorem. In 
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Figure 1. Generic combined risk model scheme. Nodes outlined with solid, dotted and 
dashed lines refer to loads, system response and consequences, respectively. 
2.3 Consistency and utility of the outcomes from the combined risk 
analysis 
The use of event tree modelling has proven to be a robust and consistent method 
for risk calculation (Castillo-Rodríguez et al., 2014; Morales-Torres et al., 2016). 
The proposed method for combined dam-levee risk modelling can be used to 
estimate risk at system scale, incorporating loads, system response and 
consequences from scenarios that take into account both types of flood defense 
infrastructures.  
Results from the combined analysis can be used to inform decisions on how to 
allocate risk reduction measures from a system-scale perspective rather than 
asset-specific. 
3. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
A case study, representing a real system in U.S., was analysed following the 
proposed method and risk model architecture in Sect.2.  
The system is composed by a 3-mile long earthen flood control dam and levees 
located in downstream river courses. The dam protects a population at risk of 
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urbanized. Two river courses (named A and B) are regulated by the dam with 
control structures on each river. The dam is normally dry with low water levels at 
the reservoir. 
The primary concerns in this system were internal erosion during the normal, 
unusual, and extreme hydrologic loading conditions; performance of the spillway 
and outlet works under significant seismic loadings (the dam is located in a 
seismically active area); and overtopping during an extreme flood event. 
Therefore, a dam risk analysis was conducted in 2011 (USACE, 2011). However, a 
risk analysis from a combined perspective including both dam and levee response 
is still required. 
The analysis described in this paper has been performed to provide answers to the 
need for assessing existing risk in a complex system composed by multiple 
structures. Previous studies have focused on single structures (dam risk analyses 
or levee performance assessments) but not providing risk outcomes from a 
comprehensive approach. Because of its high potential consequences in case of 
failure, this case study analysis aims at assisting dam and levee owners to assess 
the current situation and develop future risk-informed flood management 
strategies. 
3.1 Phase I: definition of the scope and aim of the study  
The dam includes two gated outlet structures (named A and B, with discharge into 
river courses A and B, respectively), providing water storage and flood control. 
Both courses are lined by levee structures, divided into 3 and 5 levee segments, 
respectively. A simplified scheme of the dam-levee system is depicted in Figure 2. 
Results from this case study will contribute to the discussion on how to assess risk 
in complex systems and how risk outcomes may support decision-making on flood 
risk management.  
 
Figure 2. Simplified scheme representing analysed dam-levee system. (B1 and B2 are 
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3.2 Phase II: review of available data 
Two main information sources are available: a dam risk analysis conducted in 
2011 (USACE, 2011), including dam failure probabilities for six identified potential 
failure modes for hydrologic scenario and three in case of seismic scenario. In 
addition results from applying the LST method (Margo et al., 2009) to all 
downstream levee segments are also available. 
3.3 Phase III: definition of the current situation 
The baseline scenario refers to the current situation of the system, including 
current dam operating rules during flood events.  
3.4 Phase IV: risk model architecture 
A combined dam-levee risk model is performed in this study. In addition, 
individual risk models for the dam and each levee segment were performed to 
compute risk for all sub-systems.  
The risk model architecture depicted in Fig. 3(a) is used for computing incremental 
dam risk, including hydrologic and seismic scenarios (abbreviations in are 
provided in Table 1 and Table 3). Nodes in Fig. 3(a) include input data on loads, 
system response and consequences to estimate risk from hydrologic and seismic 
scenarios. The first node, Scenario, is used for defining analysed loading scenarios 
(hydrologic and seismic). The second node, Day/night, is used for defining 
probabilities for fractioning time exposure scenarios to incorporate daily variation 
on consequences. The third node, Flood, is used to divide the event tree into 
several branches, obtaining annual exceedance probability (AEP) as a function of 
the return period of the flood event. Logarithmic interpolation was performed to 
obtain intermediate AEP values. Each AEP value is then related to a resulting water 
level at the reservoir, in node WPL, and peak outflow discharges, in node Qout, in 
case of failure and non-failure. Node FM includes six failure branches for the 
hydrologic scenario and all downstream nodes include consequence data for the 
breach and non-breach scenarios. Linear interpolation was performed to obtain 
intermediate consequences. The economic consequences were assumed to be the 
same for both day and night exposures. Failure modes with similar breach 
characteristics and hence consequences were grouped (e.g. FM1 and FM2). Non-
failure consequences were a function of peak outflow, while failure consequences 
were a function of peak pool elevation. 
For the seismic scenario, annual exceedance probabilities are obtained as a 
function of the peak ground acceleration (PGA) in node PGA and concomitant 
water levels at the reservoir in node WPL seismic. 
Similarly, the risk model architecture shown in Fig. 3(b) is used for computing 
total risk from both dam failure and non-failure cases, including hydrologic and 
seismic scenarios. Node names used in both dam risk models are defined in Table 
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Figure 3. Risk model architecture schemes for the case study: (a) dam risk model 
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Table 1. Abbreviations used in risk model architectures for the case study. 
Abbreviation Description 
A Embankment A 
ACE Annual chance of exceedance 
B Embankment B 
D Damage 
Day/Night Moment of the day 
Flood Flood event 
ECO Economic consequences 
FM Failure mode 
IE Internal erosion 
INC Incremental 
LB Loss of benefit 
LL Loss of life 
non Non-failure 
OT Overtopping 
PGA Peak ground acceleration 
PM Levee performance mode 
Qin Inflow discharge 
Qout Outflow discharge 
Scenario Hydrologic or seismic scenario 
WL Water level at levee segment 
WPL Water level at reservoir 
 
Table 2. System response combinations. 










No No Life-loss and economic damages from flooding due 
to dam failure (levee failures do not provide 




No No Life-loss and economic damages from flooding due 
to dam failure (levee failures do not provide 
appreciable additional consequences). 
No failure Yes No Life-loss and economic damages from levee failure 
in protected area A and from flooding due to dam  
releases in B. 
Yes Yes Life-loss and economic damages from levee failure 
in protected areas A and B. 
No Yes Life-loss and economic damages from levee failure 
in protected area B and from flooding due to dam  
releases in A. 
No No Life-loss and economic damages in areas A and B 






INTEGRATED FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT: TOWARDS A RISK-INFORMED DECISION MAKING  
INCORPORATING NATURAL AND HUMAN-INDUCED HAZARDS 
Table 3. Description of nodes used in dam risk models 
Node  Description 
Scenario This node is used to allow risk calculations for two analysed scenarios: 
hydrologic and seismic (diverts the event tree in two branches: one per 
scenario). 
Day/night Probabilities of being during the day or at night when the initiating event 
(flood or earthquake) occurs. 
Flood Annual exceedance probabilities of flood events. 
WPL Probabilities of being at different water levels at the reservoir when the flood 
arrives, based on dam operation. 
Qout Outflow rates through outlet works and spillways based on flood routing. 
FM Node for conducting common cause adjustment for dam failure computation. 
FM1-FM9 Failure probabilities per dam failure modes based on water elevation levels at 
the reservoir. 
LL-X-YY Life-loss estimates in case of failure in river course X (A or B) and failure mode 
YY (denoted as OT for overtopping failure mechanisms, IE for internal erosion 
and SE for seepage). 
D-X-YY Economic damage estimates in case of failure in river course X (A or B) and 
failure mode YY (denoted as OT for overtopping failure mechanisms, IE for 
internal erosion and SE for seismic loading). 
LB-X-YY Loss of benefit estimates in case of failure in river course X (A or B) and failure 
mode YY (denoted as OT for overtopping failure mechanisms, IE for internal 
erosion and SE for seismic loading). 
LL-non, D-
non 
Life-loss and economic damage estimates for non-failure cases (flood routing). 
LL-inc, D-inc Incremental life-loss and economic damage estimates based on failure and 
non-failure cases. 
D ECO-LB Economic damages and loss of benefit to compute both categories of economic 
costs from dam failure. 
PGA Probabilities for different seismic events based on peak ground acceleration 
rates. 
Qin Inflow rates into the reservoir, concomitant with the analysed seismic event 
WPL seismic Water levels at the reservoir, concomitant with the analysed seismic event 
 
The risk model architecture shown in Fig. 3(c) is used for computing flood risk 
from levee breach prior to overtopping and flooding due to overtopping (breach 
and non-breach cases) for each levee segment. Node names are defined in Table 4. 
The first node, D/, is used for defining probabilities for fractioning time exposure 
scenarios to incorporate daily variation on consequences. The second node, ACE, is 
used to relate annual exceedance probabilities (AEP) to each resulting water 
elevation at the levee segment. Node PM includes six failure branches to include 
the six potential performance modes. Nodes LL and D incorporate consequences in 
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Table 4. Description of nodes for levee risk models. 
Node  Description 
Day/night Probabilities of being during the day or at night when the flood occurs. 
ACE Annual exceedance probabilities of flood events. 
PM Node for conducting common cause adjustment for levee performance 
modes. 
PM1-PM6 Failure probabilities per levee performance mode based on water 
elevation levels. 
LL Life-loss estimates in case of failure for different water elevation levels. 
D Economic damage estimates in case of failure for different water elevation 
levels. 
 
Based on the generic risk model proposed in Sect.2 and individual risk models 
depicted in Fig.3, the combined risk model architecture used for this case study 
was defined and it is shown in Fig. 4. This model is an ad-hoc influence diagram 
developed for the case study, connecting both dam and levee individual risk 
models, and differs from the generic structure due to the following specific 
conditions: 
 Levee segments are divided into two subsystems, that is, distributed along 
two different river courses. Two distributions of outflow discharges for dam 
scenarios from flood routing are used. 
  It is assumed that for each levee subsystem, multiple levee breaches do not 
occur. 
 Common cause adjustment is applied over all failure modes for each levee 
subsystem. 
3.5 Phase V: input data 
3.5.1. Loads 
Estimates of the probabilities of occurrence of analysed loading conditions are 
included into the risk model. 
Dam. Two loading scenarios are considered for the dam (hydrologic and seismic 
scenarios). Inflow floods include events with return periods from 1-yr to 17,522-
yr. This range is divided into 20 branches in node Floods (Fig.3) of the dam risk 
model. Resulting water levels at the reservoir given the load event are included in 
node WPL (Fig.3). 
Levee. The loading function is represented by two discrete flood loading conditions 
that are based on the likelihood of the levee being loaded at any flood level 
between the toe and top. Annual chance exceedance (ACE) values for water surface 
elevations at the toe and top of all levees are used (ranging from 0.001 to 0.5). The 
range of analysed loading conditions at levees segments is also divided into 20 
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Figure 4. Combined dam-levee system risk model.  
3.5.2. System response 
Dam response. A total of 32 potential dam failure modes were identified in 2011 
consisting of both hydrologic (flood) and seismic loading conditions. Among them, 
9 failure modes are considered to be incorporated into the dam risk model. Results 
from the failure mode identification and elicitation process are included into the 
risk model, relating water level at the reservoir (loading event) and dam failure 
probabilities. 
In addition, both the regulated and breach outflow hydrographs are included, 
results from a hydraulic model using HEC-RAS are used. As an example, Figure 5 
shows outflow rates in case of dam failure. Figures 6 and 7 show an extract of 
conditional failure probabilities for considered dam failure modes (hydrologic and 
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Figure 5. Outflow peak discharges (Qout) in case of dam failure and water levels at reservoir 
(WPL) per return period of inflow flood event.  
 
Figure 6. Conditional failure probabilities per dam failure mode: hydrologic scenario.  
 
Figure 7. Extract of dam fragility curves for seismic scenario (peak ground acceleration 
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Figure 6 depicts input data probabilities per dam failure mode (FM) for the 
hydrologic scenario: scour in a poorly compacted layer in the embankment 
adjacent to a gallery at B-side (FM1), scour of the embankment at A-side (FM2), 
backward erosion piping in foundation of central dam body (FM3), backward 
erosion piping in foundation at A-side (FM4), dam overtopping (FM5), and erosion 
into the collapsed toe drain at the B-side embankment (FM6). Three failure modes 
are considered for the seismic scenario (Fig.3): failure of outlet works walls during 
an earthquake (FM7), seismic deformation of embankment leading to overtopping 
(FM8) and internal erosion in embankment due to transverse cracking due to 
earthquake (FM9). 
Levee response. Similarly, failure probabilities for loads up to top of levee were 
derived from the LST assessment (Margo et al., 2009) for the 6 potential 
performance modes (PMs): embankment and foundation seepage and piping 
(PM1), embankment stability (PM2), embankment erosion (PM3), floodwall 
underseepage and piping (PM4), floodwall stability (PM5), and closure systems 
(PM6). For overtopping events, a failure probability equal to 1 is assumed for 
water elevations 0.5m [1.64 ft] above top of levee (instead of applying pf=1 at top). 
It is considered that failure will occur for elevations above that level. Consequently, 
the curve shown in Figure 8 is applied for estimating levee performance 
probabilities based on loading conditions. In this figure, the distribution used for 
failure probability estimations in nodes FM is shown based on water elevations at 
toe (ELTOE) and top of levee (ELTOP). As an example, levee failure probabilities for 
water elevations at levee crest are shown in Figure 9 for levee segments A1, A2 
and A3, including results for performance modes from PM1 to PM4. 
  
Figure 8. Failure probability (left) and consequence distribution (right) for levee segments 
based on water elevations (EL). 
3.5.3. Consequences 
Estimation of consequences, including life loss and economic impacts for 
both failure and non-failure scenarios, is critical to a successful risk assessment. 
Consequences are available by an estimate of potential fatalities and economic 
damages for the following scenarios:  
a) dam failure with no levee breaches;   
b) dam non-failure with levee breach prior to overtopping of levee;  
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d) dam non-failure with no levee breaches.   
HEC-RAS and FLO-2D models were developed for the study in 2011 to simulate 
dam failure and non-failure scenarios over a range of possible hydrologic loading 
conditions. The HEC-LifeSim method  (Bowles and Aboelata, 2005) was used for 
life-loss estimations and results have been incorporated into the risk model. The 
HEC-LifeSim method uses arrival times and hydraulic conditions in downstream 
areas to estimate fatality rates based on flood depths, velocities, and combined 
depth-velocity ratios. For levees, life-loss estimations were conducted based on the 
LST method, applying fatality rates proposed by Jonkman et al. (Jonkman et al., 
2008). The curve shown in Figure 8 is applied for estimating life-loss based on 
levee response conditions. The distribution is modified for each levee segment 
based on outputs from the LST method for water elevations at toe (ELTOE) and top 
of levee (ELTOP).  
Economic impacts due to dam failure were evaluated in 2011, including physical 
damage to structures, contents, and vehicles; the value of project benefits that 
would be foregone; and estimates to repair the dam. Other damages such as those 
to crops and infrastructure were not included. Damage to structures, contents, and 
vehicles were estimated with HEC-FIA modeling. Damage is based on peak flood 
depths for the evaluated flood events and estimated using HAZUS depth-damage 
curves for structures, contents, and vehicles (Scawthorn et al., 2006). In addition, 
the total project flood damage reduction, recreation and water supply benefits lost 
due to dam failure are considered. However, indirect costs were not considered. 
Results were incorporated into the risk model. The method used for estimating 
economic consequences for levee failure is also based on the use of depth-damage 
curves and can be found in the description of the LST  (Margo et al., 2009). 
In the dam risk analysis, it was assumed that levees located downstream do not fail 
when considering dam performance. Hydraulic simulations of dam response 
scenarios assumed the levees were in place with no potential for breach.  
Assuming no levee breaches, flood consequences for dam non-failure scenarios 
range from 0 to 10 fatalities and 18,026 $M in damages (peak discharge up to 
7,800 m³/s). For dam failure scenarios, flood consequences reach 214 fatalities 
and 42,076 $M in damages (peak discharge up to 10,410 m³/s). For levee failure 
scenarios, the maximum values belong to levee segment B2 (20 m high), up to 300 
fatalities and 13,383 $M in damages. 
As an example, Figures 10 and 11 show an extract of input data on economic and 
life-loss consequences due to dam failure (internal erosion failure modes) and 
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Figure 9. Levee failure probabilities per performance mode for water elevation at top of 
levee crest (levee segments A1, A2 and A3). 
 
Figure 10. Economic consequences from dam failure (internal erosion failure modes: 
embankments A and B). 
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3.6 Phase VI: risk calculation 
The software tool iPresas Calc, developed by iPresas Risk Analysis, is used to 
perform risk calculations (iPresas Risk Analysis, 2014). Separate event trees were 
considered to compute incremental and total risk for the dam, risk for each levee 
segment and a combined dam-levee model to obtain the total flood risk estimate. A 
common cause adjustment was applied to all non-mutually exclusive dam failure 
modes and levee performance modes. 
Results from the separate dam risk model (not including risk associated with 
potential breach of levees) are shown in Table 5. The estimated incremental 
societal risk is 0.01 lives per year and dam failure probability is about 1.34·10-4.  
Results from levee models are included in Table 6 and are shown in Figure 12. 
Incremental risk results range from 0.001 up to 4.5 lives per year. Annual levee 
failure probabilities are generally greater than 10-4 and annualized societal 
incremental risk above 0.01 lives per year.  
 
Figure 12. Failure probability, societal and economic risk per levee segment based on risk 
outcomes from separate risk models. 
3.7 Phase VII: risk representation 
Figure 13 shows the fN pairs for the dam and each levee segment. Results show 
that levee segments in subsystem B present, in general, higher values. 
Finally, results from the combined model are included in Table 7. Estimated 
ssocietal risk is approx. 5.5 lives per year and economic risk is about $M 292 per 
year. 
Figure 14 depicts FN-curves for both dam risk model (total risk terms) and the 
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Table 5. Results from dam risk model (incremental vs total risks).  
Risk model Dam (incremental) Dam (total) 




1.34E-04 1.55E-06 1.35E-04 - - - 
Economic risk 
($/yr) 
1,045,961    2,368    1,048,328    17,518,841    4,922    17,523,763    
Societal risk 
(fatalities/yr) 
0.0104 0.000012 0.0104 0.0131 0.000012 0.0131 
 









A1 4.44E-03  126,500    1.05E-03 
A2  1.35E-03  3,425,148    7.17E-02 
A3 5.81E-03  31,032,335    4.96E-01 
B1 2.26E-03  6,392,352    1.32E-01 
B2 2.68E-02  238,628,175    4.50E+00 
B3 6.69E-03  8,490,563    2.00E-01 
B4 3.09E-04  307,445    6.27E-03 
B5 2.08E-03  6,505,021    2.02E-01 
Table 7. Results from combined dam-levee model.   
Scenario Hydrologic Seismic Global 
Economic risk ($/yr) 291,628,124 4,922 291,628,124 
Societal risk 
(fatalities/yr) 
5.55 1.24E-05 5.55 
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Figure 14. FN curves from dam risk model vs. combined dam-levee risk model.  
3.8 Phase VIII: sensitivity analyses 
Different bounds for common cause adjustment (CCA) were applied to evaluate the 
impact on risk results of selected options. Figure 15 shows FN-curves for two 
situations applying upper (base case) and lower bounds. Societal risk for the case 
study applying the lower bound for CCA is estimated to be 3.42 lives per year 
(about 61% of societal risk obtained from applying upper bounds for CCA, as 
proposed in the LST). If no adjustment for common cause of dam and levee failure 
is made, the estimate of societal risk increases to 5.7 lives per year. 
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4. DISCUSSION 
Results from combined risk analysis of complex systems can inform decisions on 
selecting actions for flood risk reduction, based on the contribution of each 
element of the system. 
Focusing only on risk analysis of the dam (Table 5), results show both the 
incremental societal risk and probability of failure are above tolerability 
recommendations for dams used by many agencies (Munger et al., 2009). As such, 
measures to reduce incremental risk associated with the dam should be 
investigated. Typically, remediation measures should include a wide range of 
options, including those that reduce frequency and magnitude of loading, those 
that reduce probability of breach given loads, and those that reduce consequence 
in the case of flooding.  
In total risk terms, societal risk is estimated at about 0.013 lives per year. Based on 
those estimates, 77% of total risk is due to incremental risk. Therefore, decreasing 
incremental risk by lower the probability of failure or associated consequences 
would also have a significant impact on total risks.  
For the presented case study, the potential life loss is relatively high. Much of this 
is due to the fact that people are located directly downstream from the dam, 
meaning they do not have very much time to receive warning and evacuate if 
something goes wrong at the dam. Therefore, one potential risk reduction 
alternative could be installation of warning sirens directly downstream from the 
dam. Additional analysis with those sirens in place shows that life loss could be 
reduced by approximately 30% if the dam was to breach (due to larger warning 
times). While installation of sirens would not reduce the probability of failure 
(therefore not addressing that portion of the tolerability criteria), they will reduce 
the overall incremental and total risk for a relatively small financial investment. 
Results from the levee analysis (no dam failure) show the risk is orders of 
magnitude higher than the risk associated with dam failure. This is not surprising, 
at least in the U.S., as the typical large dam has a spillway that allows for it to safely 
pass very rare hydrologic events (1 in 10,000 chance per year or less frequent) 
without breaching, while the typical levee is designed to pass much lower 
frequency events, and is not designed to withstand overtopping.  
Results for the case study show the overall risk for the community downstream of 
the dam is mainly driven by levee segment B2. Therefore, investing in remediation 
activities at this segment would impact on societal risk from a system perspective. 
For example, reducing the probability of failure for the driving failure modes 
(embankment seepage and floodwall stability) by an order of magnitude could 
reduce risk from an estimated 5.55 lives and $M 292 per year to 1.94 lives and $M 
100 per year. However, additional considerations should be taken into account 
when analysing efficiency of risk reduction measures, such as budget limitations, 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presents an approach for analysing risk in complex systems by 
combining information from multiple structures. The basis behind such approach 
rely on the potential of event tree modelling to analyse risk from multiple 
combinations of load-system response-consequence event, tested by the authors 
for a real case study. 
Several points are herein summarized. 
 The procedure described in this paper, based on event tree modeling and 
risk analysis techniques, illustrates quantitative risk information can be 
combined to provide risk estimations for all elements within the system. 
 For this study, the aim was to provide a framework for combined risk 
modeling that may benefit from advances in dam and levee safety risk 
characterization. This risk modeling approach may evolve in line with 
further research on input data estimations for dam and levee safety risk 
analysis. 
 In practice, each dam or levee operator may choose different methods for 
input data estimations (e.g. loading conditions, life-loss estimations, etc.). 
The risk model architecture here presented can be used to estimate risk by 
integrating information from different sources of information in nature and 
level of detail. However, it is noted that the analyses of complex dam-levee 
systems requires the use of homogenous methods for characterizing inputs 
from both dam and levees. Hence, dam and safety risk analyses would 
benefit from standardization concerning loads, system response and 
consequence estimation methods.   
 In this paper, the presented approach has been applied to a real case study 
(location and details are kept confidential) to analyse risk at system scale. 
 Regarding levee performance, probabilities for levee breach prior to 
overtopping based on the LST were used, adapted to incorporate non-
failure scenarios for overtopping events up to +0.5 m from top of levee. 
Other generic levee failure probability functions are available (Pinter et al., 
2016) and could be used, but site-specific conditions were considered 
during levee screening assessments to evaluate performance at each levee 
segment thus obtaining performance rates for this particular example. In 
addition, the adopted levee failure probability distribution function 
considers +0.5m as a reference level for all segments. It is recognised that 
this overtopping height could be adapted based on levee height in further 
studies. 
 As shown in the case study, correlation among failure modes might 
condition results depending on the adopted hypothesis for CCA. Further 
research will be focused on analysing the impact of system 
interdependencies on risk outcomes. In addition, it is assumed that multiple 
levee breaches do not occur within the same subsystem. Recent studies 
have focused on providing new methods for analysing multi-component 
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(Roscoe et al., 2015). Further research will focus on how to couple 
advanced reliability techniques into event tree modeling for combined dam-
levee systems. 
From a general perspective on how this approach will impact on safety 
management of flood defense infrastructures, some remarks are here included. 
 The proposed approach can be adapted to other dam and levee systems. 
The presented risk model architecture is generic and can be adapted to site-
specific characteristics as shown in its application to a case study.  
 The procedure described in this paper allows obtaining risk outcomes for 
complex systems that are valuable to a wide variety of actors (e.g. local, 
river basin and national authorities, water boards and emergency agencies). 
Within this context, the level of detail of the analysis should match the 
needs of decision makers. Therefore, the presented approach allows to 
estimate risk for systems including several infrastructures. Having an 
overall picture of quantitative flood risk for the whole system, able to 
capture the contribution of each element, will help decision-makers to 
better understand risks and define actions for risk reduction. 
Finally, a major challenge to be addressed when evaluating risk in complex 
systems is the application of tolerability recommendations at system scale. 
Although recent efforts have been allocated on defining tolerability guidelines for 
levee safety (in line with current dam safety practices), there is still a need for 
defining criteria to evaluate risk at larger scales (e.g. district, region scale). 
Examples can be found in the literature for regional flood risk studies (Jonkman et 
al., 2011; Voortman et al., 2003). However, the acceptable level of flood risk in a 
given study area may differ among regions and countries since economic, societal 
and environmental criteria considered for defining tolerability limits may be 
different (depending on existing risk aversion, risk component to be considered or 
risk dimension, e.g. incremental or total terms). Outcomes from combined risk 
modelling as presented in this paper provide input for such discussion. 
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